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Slavov: Employment Law

EMPLOYMENT LAW
JOHNSON v. STATE OF OREGON
141 F.3d 1361 (9th Cir. 1998)

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) requires
employers to provide reasonable accommodations to its disabled employees to enable them to perform the essential functions of their position} In Johnson v. State of Oregon,2 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined the circumstances in which the doctrine of judicial estoppel could bar a claim under the ADA when the litigant has
sought or received disability benefits. 3 Because this was an
issue of first impression, the court relied upon Federal Guidelines and case law from other circuits to conclude that the pursuit or receipt of disability benefits does not per se bar an indi-

1. See e.g., Johnson v. State of Oregon, 141 F.3d 1361, 1364 (9th Cir. 1998). The ADA
provides:
No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application
procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. [T]he term "discriminate" includes--(5)(A) not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise
qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless
such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an
undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity.
42 U.S.C. §12112.
2. 141 F.3d 1361 (9th Cir. 1998). The appeal from the United States District Court for
the District of Oregon was argued and submitted on January 8, 1998 in front of Circuit
Judge Aldisert, Circuit Judge Pregerson, and Circuit Judge Trott. The decision was
filed on April 20, 1998. Circuit Judge Trott authored the opinion.
3. See Johnson, 141 F.3d at 1363.
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vidual from making a claim against his or her former employer
under the ADA 4
II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Ms. Leslie Johnson was an office specialist for the State of
Oregon's Vocational Rehabilitation Division (VRD) from 1991
until her termination in 1994. 5 Johnson suffers from Carpal
Tunnel Syndrome. 6 Her condition worsened during the time
she was employed by the VRD.7 Finally, after the last round of
surgery, her doctor recommended a number of unspecified· accommodations that would facilitate her return to work. 8 The
VRD, however, terminated Johnson's employment on September 8, 1994, because it determined that her requested accommodations were unreasonable. 9 In September of 1995, Johnson
filed an action against the VRD for disability discrimination in
violation of the ADA 10
The United States District Court for the District of Oregon
concluded that the representations Johnson had made in her
application for disability benefits, regarding her incapacity to
work, judicially estopped her from pursuing a claim under the
ADA as a "qualified person with a disability who could perform
the principle functions of her job with reasonable accommodations."ll The district court ruled that Johnson could not establish that she could perform the essential functions of her position after she had made prior representations in order to obtain

4. See id.
5. See Johnson, 141 F.3d 1361, 1364 (9th Cir. 1998).
6. See id. Carpal Tunnel Syndrome is "a disorder of the hand characterized by pain,
weakness, and numbness in the thumb and other fingers, caused by an inflamed ligament that presses on a nerve in the wrist." Webster's College Dictionary 208 (1996).
7. See Johnson, 141 F.3d at 1364.
8. See id. Johnson underwent five rounds of surgery between 1986 and 1994 to relieve her sYmptoms.
9. See id. The specific accommodations Johnson was seeking are not specified in the
court's opinion.
10. See id.
11. [d.
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benefits based on a total disability.12 Hence, the district court
dismissed Johnson's claim in summary judgment. 13
The Ninth Circuit disagreed, however, stating that the definition of "disabled," for the purposes of obtaining benefits, is
.not necessarily the same as that for pursuing a claim under the
ADA 14 Therefore, Johnson could properly pursue both claims
depending on the definition being used. 15

III.

THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

The Ninth Circuit first examined the propriety of a per se
rule that would bar an individual who applied for or received
disability benefits from maintaining a claim under the ADA 16
Finding a per se rule inappropriate, the court analyzed the issue within the particular facts of Johnson's case to hold that a
material issue of fact remained, making summary judgment
improper. 17

12. See Johnson, 141 F.3d at 1365-66. A court's decision that once an individual
makes representations of total disability in seeking disability benefits that individual
cannot later come back and assert that she could work if she were accommodated,
amounts to a per se rule barring ADA claims once an individual has filed for disability
benefits. See id.
13. See Johnson, 141 F.3d at 1364. Prior to trial, the VRD had filed a motion for
summary judgment, based on judicial estoppel. That motion failed because it was unsupported by documentation. The district court, however, allowed VRD to renew the
motion during trial and granted it. See id.
14. See Johnson, 141 F.3d at 1367. The Ninth Circuit stated:
Because of the different definitions of disability under the ADA and under the
various policies of disability benefits-providers, an individual may be disabledand therefore entitled to disability benefits so long as she is not working-and
still be a qualified individual under the ADA becaUse she can work with reasonable accommodations, if her employer will provide them. Thus, neither application for nor receipt of disability benefits automatically bars a claimant
from establishing that she is a qualified person with a disability under the
ADA.
.
[d.
15. See id. Hence, application of a per se rule is inappropriate.
16. See Johnson, 141 F.3d 1361, 1366 (9th Cir. 1998). In determining if a per se
rule existed barring ADA claims in this circumstance, the Ninth Circuit applied a de
novo standard of review. See id. at 1364.
.
17. See id. at 1368. In determining if the district court's application of judicial estoppel to the particular facts of the case was proper, the Ninth Circuit applied an abuse
of discretion standard of review. See id. at 1364.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1999

3

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 9

66

A

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:63
JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL AS A PER SE RULE

The Ninth Circuit relied on the distinguishable purposes of
the Social Security Administration (SSA) and the ADA, Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guidelines, and
case law to conclude that a per se rule barring an individual
from asserting an ADA claim once they have applied for or received disability benefits was not consistent with current law. 18
The purpose of the ADA is to "prevent discrimination and
[to] further work opportunities for those with disabilities."'9

The SSA, on the other hand, provides disability benefits for
those who are so severely impaired that they are unable to do
their job or any other job considering their age and experience.20 SSA's determination of eligibility for disability benefits
is made without consideration of whether the employee could
perform the duties of the job with reasonable accommodations. 21 In contrast, the key to an ADA claim is the efficacy of
reasonable accommodations necessary to allow someone to perform the essential functions of their job. 22
In addition, the EEOC guidelines provide further support
for rejecting a per se rule.23 The EEOC guidelines state that an

18. See Johnson, 141 F.3d at 1366-67. In conducting its analysis, the Ninth Circuit
court first compared the purposes of the ADA and SSA. One of the central issues in this
case was how to reconcile an individual's statements to one administration (i.e, the SSA)
that they are unable to work due to total disability, while telling the court that they
were able to work with reasonable accommodations as mandated by the ADA. See w.
Next, the court analyzed prior cases. See w. And, finally, the court considered the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) guidelines in dealing with this
type of situation. See w.
19. See Johnson, 141 F.3d at 1366.
20. See w.
21. See w. The Social Security Act does not take into account an individual's ability to work with accommodations. Thus, where "a claimant had no accommodation in
his or her past work, a Social Security Administration determination that the claimant
cannot do past work says nothing about the claimant's ability to perform his or her
former job with reasonable accommodation." [d. This has led the SSA to conclude: "The
ADA and the disability provision of the Social Security Act have different purposes and
have no direct application to one another." [d. (quoting, Swanks v. Washington Metro.
Area Transit Auth., 116 F.3d 582, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
22. See Johnson, 141 F.3d at 1366.
23. See Johnson, 141 F.3d at 1367. A recent EEOC Enforcement Guidance explains:
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individual's representations of total disability for the purpose of
obtaining benefits is not necessarily inconsistent with the pursuit of an ADA claim. 24 This is because of the differences in the
definitional requirements for obtaining benefits and pursuing a
claim.25 "Accordingly, [the representations made in obtaining
disability benefits] should never be an automatic bar to an
ADA claim. "26
B.

JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL BASED ON THE PARTICULAR FACTS
OF THE CASE

Although the Ninth Circuit did not adopt a per se rule, the
court concluded that the representations made on benefits applications are relevant. Z1 In fact, the representations are
binding in an ADA proceeding as truthful assertions of the
claimant's condition.28 Moreover, the court found a litigant's
prior representations are important because they could defeat
the litigant's prima facie case29 and could indicate that no material issue of fact remains. 30

Because of the inherent differences in the definitions of the term "qualified
individual with a disability" under the ADA and the terms used in ... disability
benefits programs ... an individual can meet both the eligibility requirements
for receipt of disability benefits and the definition of a "qualified individual with
a disability" for ADA purposes. Thus, a person's representations that slhe is
"disabled" or "totally disabled" for purposes of disability benefits are not
necessarily inconsistent with hislher representations that slhe is a "qualified
individual with a disability." Accordingly, they should never be an automatic
bar to an ADA claim.
Johnson, 141 F.3d at 1367 (Citing EEOC Enforcement Guidance, Notice No. 915.002,
February 12, 1997, II.A.).
24. See Johnson, 141 F.3d at 1367.
25. See id. For example, although a person could work if provided with reasonable
accommodations 88 required by the ADA, that person would be totally disabled without
such accommodations. See id.
26. See id. (citing, EEOC Enforcement Guidance, Notice No. 915.002, February 12,
1997,II.A.)
27. See Johnson, 141 F.3d at 1368.
28. See id.
29. See Johnson, 141 F.3d at 1369. The court noted that "[flor example, a plaintifl's
prior representations may be so strong and definitive that they will defeat the plaintifl's
prima facie case on traditional summary judgment grounds." Id.; see also, Kennedy I).
Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477 (9th Cir. 1996).
30. See, Johnson, 141 F.3d at 1369. For example, if the litigant stated on the disability benefits applications that they were permanently disabled from all work, irrele-
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Applying the facts of the case, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that the plaintift's assertions to the various disability benefit
providers did not contradict her disability discrimination claim
under the ADA 31 Therefore, the court found that the district
court had abused its discretion in granting summary judgment
because a material question of fact regarding the ADA claim
remained. 32

IV.

IMPLICATIONS OF DECISION

The Ninth Circuit's decision in Johnson v. State of Oregon is
in accord with a growing number of United States Circuit
Courts that are disagreeing with the application of a per se rule
barring ADA claims by individuals who previously applied for
or obtained disability benefits. 33 Although seemingly illogical,
the Ninth Circuit's decision in Johnson is just. While one
should not be able to contradict statements made under penalty of perjury, an assertion of a claim under the ADA is not
necessarily a contradiction to a claim for disability benefits. 34
The Ninth Circuit noted that judicial estoppel "is an equitable doctrine, invoked by the court at its own discretion, and
driven by the specific facts of the case. Accordingly, a per se
rule barring claimants from pursuing ADA claims after seeking
vant of accommodations, no material issue would remain-summary judgment would be
granted. See id.
31. Seeid.
32. See Johnson, 141 F.3d 1363.
33. See Johnson, 141 F.3d 1361, 1367 (9th Cir. 1998). See also, Talavera v. School
Bd. Of Palm Beach County, 129 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that it was improper
to apply a per se rule of estoppel); Griffith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 135 F.3d 376, 382
(6th Cir. 1998) (holding that applying a per ,a rule of estoppel is contrary to the truthseeking function of the court); Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems, Corp., 120
F.3d 513, 517 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 119 S.Ct. 39 (1998) (declining to adopt a per
se rule of estoppel); Swanks v. Washington Metropolitan Area transit Authority, 116
F.3d 582, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that application for disability benefits cannot be
an automatic bar to an ADA claim).
Only the Third Circuit, in McNemar v. The Disney Store, was in conflict with
these circuits when it upheld a district court's use of judicial estoppel to preclude a
litigant's claim under the ADA. Subsequently, in Krouse v. American Sterilizer Co.,
however, the Third Circuit clarified its ruling in McNemar, stating that the case was
being misapplied and in fact does not support a per se rule.
34. See Johnson, 141 F.3d 1366. Because the standards for evaluating an application for disability benefits and a claim under the ADA are different, a contradiction is
not inevitable between the two. See id.
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or obtaining benefits runs counter to the doctrine of judicial
estoppel itself."35 Forcing an individual to choose between obt~ining disability benefits and pursuing a claim under the ADA
runs counter to the purpose of the ADA 36 The ADA was created to protect disabled persons from discrimination. 37 If, however, an individual is unable to assert hislher rights under the
ADA because that individual is forced by financial necessity to
seek disability benefits, the ADA may as well not exist. 36
The Ninth Circuit had an opportunity to revisit this issue in
Lujan v. Pacific Maritime Association.39 The plaintiff, Lujan,
suffered from a disability, which resulted in the loss of use of
his right arm and hand and difficulty in moving his neck. 40
Lujan applied for a longshoreman's job. 41 Although some longshoreman's jobs involve strenuous physical demands, others
are less demanding, such as signal work and various clerk positions. 42 Lujan filed an ADA claim seeking accommodations,
which included being excused from the portion of the employment examination which tests physical strength and agility. 43
The district court dismissed Lujan's claim because Lujan had
received disability benefits. 44 The Ninth Circuit reversed the
district court's determination on the authority of Johnson. 46
Similar opinions have been expressed by numerous other
circuits46 and in various administrative proceedings. 47 Moreo35. Johnson, 141 F.3d 1368.
36. See id. The court noted that:
Faced with the financial pressures accompanying the loss of a job and the
uncertainty and length of litigation, individuals might well elect immediate
benefits over the pursuit of even the most meritorious ADA claim. Such a
situation would not only harm the individuals the ADA seeks to protect, it also
would protect the very activity the ADA seeks to eliminate: discrimination
against disabled individuals.
Id.
See id. at 1366.
See id. at 1368.
165 F.3d 738 (9th Cir. 1999).
Lujan, 165 F.3d at 739.
See id.
.
See id. at 739-40.
See id. at 740.
See id.
45. Lujan, 165 F.3d at 739.
46. See e.g., supra note 33. See also, Pena v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 154
F.3d 267 (5th Cir. 1998) (declining to adopt a per se rule specifically because SSA defini37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
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ver, this issue will ultimately be addressed by the United
States Supreme Court as certiorari has been granted in Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems, Corp. 48
Beryl Slavov *

tions of disability differ significantly with definitions under the ADA); Rascon v. U.S.
West Communications, Inc., 143 F.3d 1324 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that application or
receipt of disability benefits is not a bar to a claim under the ADA).
47. See e.g., Lamberson v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 1999 WL 41623 (M.S.P.D.,
1999). After conducting a thorough analysis of the rulings on this issue by the various
circuits, the board in Lamberson determined that a per Be rule biuTing an ADA claim
when the plaintiff has filed for or obtained disability benefits would be improper. id.
The court also noted the upcoming review by the Supreme Court of Cleueland v. Policy
Management Systems, Corp. on this issue. See id. at 'II 29.
48. See Cleveland v. Policy Management Sytems Corp., 120 F.3d 513, 517 (5th Cir.
1997) (cert. granted 119 S.Ct. 39 (1998».
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1999.
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